



UNITED NATIONS  
*Office on Drugs and Crime*

**ADDRESSING ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG  
TRAFFICKING IN IRAQ**

**REPORT OF THE UNODC FACT FINDING MISSION  
5-18 AUGUST 2003**

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Vienna**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This mission report was compiled in the immediate aftermath of the tragic bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, which claimed the lives of many UN staff including Sergio Vieira de Mello the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG).

The mission completed its work in Baghdad on 18 August greatly encouraged by the commitment and dedication shown by Sergio de Mello and his staff to tackling the many problems facing the people of Iraq, including the pressing issue of improving security in the country. Sergio de Mello left a lasting impression on the team members and his vision will continue to inspire.

The mission team also wish to acknowledge with deep appreciation the role of Nadia Younes, the SRSG's Chief of Staff, who also perished in the attack, and who had provided critical support and advice in the complex political environment of Baghdad.

Thanks are due to Mr. Ramiro Lopes da Silva, deputy SRSG and Humanitarian Coordinator as well as to Colonel Jeff Davie, the SRSG's military advisor, who provided invaluable assistance and logistical support throughout the mission.

The mission team wish to take the opportunity to thank the Iraqi officials who kindly gave of their time by providing information, assistance and advice which led to a greater understanding of the security situation in general and organized crime and drug trafficking in particular.

Specific thanks are due to Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and Ambassador David Richmond, Special Envoy for Iraq of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and their respective military and civilian advisors and officials.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the war which led to the overthrow of the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority assumed responsibility for administrating the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future. In July 2003 a Governing Council of 25 members was appointed. National elections are planned for 2004.

In August 2003, at the request of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime conducted a fact finding mission to Iraq. After initially conducting interviews in Baghdad, the mission team travelled to the southern region of the country and held meetings at Basrah and the port of Umm Quasr. Visits were also made to two control points on the border with Kuwait. In the north, meetings were held in the cities of Mosul and Erbil. The mission team also took into account the findings of several previous assessment missions in respect of the police, judiciary and customs.

The mission team concluded that the evolving nature of organized crime in Iraq is based on sophisticated smuggling networks, many established under the previous regime, as well as new forms of organized criminal activity and smuggling. A particular problem currently is the trafficking in stolen oil and copper. There is evidence of drug trafficking mainly in the south-eastern and northern border regions of the country. Iraq's porous borders, an established culture of smuggling, combined with its geographic location – situated near to one of the major drug routes for the smuggling of opiates from Afghanistan – suggests the strong possibility of growth in drug trafficking.

There has been a recent upsurge in the levels of violent crime, including murder, kidnapping with extortion and the hijacking of vehicles. There are indications that many such offences, particularly kidnapping, are linked to the development of organized crime. The conditions for the expansion of organized crime include the absence of the rule of law, the disintegration of state institutions and the promotion of various forms of smuggling under the previous regime. Such factors have taken place against the backdrop of a deterioration in socio-economic conditions in the past decade. While drug abuse in Iraq is not perceived to be a serious problem, key indicators suggest that there is an emerging problem of abuse with potential for dramatic growth.

Serious challenges lie ahead for the future Government of Iraq in tackling organized crime and drug trafficking. An effective and humane criminal justice system is not yet in place. An essential first step will be to establish an adequate legal framework in compliance with the international conventions on drugs, organized crime and terrorism.

Also of concern is the current inability of the Iraqi police to combat organized crime and drug trafficking in an effective manner. Police infrastructure is weak with police stations having been damaged and looted in the aftermath of the war. The police require equipment and training in specialist skills. Customs and border controls are in need of strengthening. Effective systems of oversight will be required as an integral part of an efficient criminal justice response.

The CPA has made substantial efforts to address the problems of insecurity by responding to the immediate requirements such as rebuilding and reopening police stations, beginning police

training, providing equipment, instigating police patrols and establishing a specialized unit to investigate major crime in Baghdad. Similar efforts are being made in respect of the justice system.

Based upon the mission's assessment, a number of recommendations have been made in various key areas to complement the efforts already being made and planned by the CPA and the Governing Council. These relate to: legal assistance, institution and capacity building, the prevention of drug abuse and promoting regional and international cooperation. Full details of the recommendations are to be found at the end of the report.

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## **GLOSSARY OF TERMS**

CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
ICPO-INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IDU	Injecting drug use
IPTIP	Iraqi Police Transition Integration Programme
IPF	Iraqi Police Force
NCIU	National Criminal Intelligence Unit
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOCHI	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO	World Customs Organization
WHO	World Health Organization

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In August 2003 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) conducted a fact finding mission to Iraq. The mission was in response to a request by the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq (SRSG), Sergio Vieira de Mello. In his statement before the Security Council on 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2003 where he outlined the purpose of the UNODC mission, Sergio de Mello emphasised the requirement to examine how strategies might be developed to deal with different types of organized crime, particularly drug trafficking. The main objective of the mission was to assess the extent of organized crime and drug trafficking and review the current legal and institutional framework in order to make appropriate recommendations. A copy of the terms of reference is attached as Annex A.

2. The UNODC team greatly benefited from the findings of a number of needs assessment missions undertaken at the bilateral level. An assessment of the Iraqi police structure was conducted in May 2003 by a team of international policing experts. In July 2003 assessments were carried out both by the United States (US) Department of Justice of the judicial system as well as by the United Kingdom's (UK) customs and excise service into the Iraqi customs service. Recommendations identifying future requirements were made in all three of these sectors. The UNODC team has also taken into account a series of assessments conducted by civil society institutions.

3. The mission team held interviews and meetings with Ambassador Bremer and other representatives of the CPA responsible for interior, justice, health and culture. They also met with representatives of the Governing Council and officials from the police, judiciary, customs, border control, ports authority and the health sector. Meetings were also conducted with military representatives of the US and the UK together with civilian police and customs advisors.

4. In order to obtain more detailed information, the mission team visited a number of specific locations. These included: two border control posts at Safwan and Umm Quasr on the border with Kuwait, the port of Umm Quasr, the police Academy in Baghdad and the police training establishment in Mosul, police headquarters and a police station in Baghdad. Meetings took place with various diplomatic representatives as well as officials from other agencies of the United Nations.

5. The team initially visited Baghdad, followed by visits to the south and north of Iraq. A bomb explosion at the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on 7 August that resulted in a number of fatalities as well as other security incidents led to the cancellation of some planned meetings in Baghdad. In the south of the country, due to the volatile security situation in Basrah the team was prevented from entering the city, with interviews being confined to Basrah International Airport and the port of Umm Quasr. The city of Nassriyah was also visited. In the north meetings took place in Mosul and Erbil. A copy of the list of officials met and of the itinerary are attached as Annex B and C.

6. Before departing, debriefings were held with Ambassador Bremer, Ambassador Richmond and other senior officials of CPA and the SRSG, Sergio de Mello.

7. This report contains an overview of organized crime and drug trafficking in Iraq followed by a number of recommendations.

8. The following are the UNODC staff members who conducted the fact finding mission:  
Bernard Frahi: Chief, Partnership in Development Branch, and Head of Mission;  
Mohamed Abdul-Aziz: Chief, Legal Advisory Section;  
Brian Taylor: Chief, Anti-Trafficking Section; and,  
Mark Shaw: Anti-Organized Crime Unit.

## **II. CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS**

9. Apart from a large number of information gathering meetings and interviews, the mission team was guided by a series of consultations with high-level officials. A synopsis of those meetings is provided at the outset.

### ***Governing Council***

10. Representatives and advisors of the Governing Council provided the mission team with an overview of concerns in respect of organized crime, drug trafficking and the potential for increased levels of drug abuse. They expressed the view that the mission was particularly timely in highlighting an area that is of high priority for the Council. Assistance was requested from UNODC particularly in respect of the drafting of legislation on drug control, the creation of a legal framework to combat organized crime and the drafting of legislation to counter money laundering. Emphasis was placed on the fact that there were high expectations that UNODC would provide such assistance.

11. It was agreed that the issue would be brought to the attention of the full Council for further discussions and follow-up. A formal request for assistance will be made through the Office of the SRSG.

### ***Coalition Provisional Authority***

12. The mission met with Ambassador Paul Bremer, Administrator of the CPA, in order to provide a summary of the work carried out as well as to review the findings and proposed areas of intervention by UNODC and to obtain guidance on the future involvement of the Office. Ambassador Bremer agreed in principle with the proposals, highlighting the need to assist the Iraqi people in meeting the requirements of their international obligations.

13. Ambassador Bremer also emphasised the need to ensure coordination of activities undertaken by various organisations and to avoid duplication as resources are limited. Finally, he highlighted the importance of addressing organized crime as a top priority and recognised the potential for the growth of drug trafficking and the need to prevent the expansion of drug abuse at an early stage.

14. Ambassador Bremer indicated that a mission from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was planned for the coming weeks. Subsequent to the interview with Ambassador Bremer the mission team offered to brief the DEA mission participants prior to their visit to Iraq.

15. The mission team also met with the UK's Special Representative for Iraq, Ambassador David Richmond. He provided valuable background at the start of the mission and was briefed on its outcome.

### ***Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and the Resident Coordinator***

16. During an initial meeting and a debriefing session with the mission team, the SRSG Sergio de Mello expressed concern at the gravity of the situation in respect of increasing levels of organized crime and the potential for the growth in drug trafficking and abuse. A series of areas of possible interventions where the UN could play a complementary role to the ongoing efforts of the Governing Council and the CPA in order to combat organized crime and drug trafficking were identified and discussed. While endorsing the proposals of the mission team, Sergio de Mello emphasised at the concluding meeting that UNODC, given the current difficult security situation and the rise of organized crime, had an important role to play in assisting Iraq and should be fully involved as part of the broader UN reconstruction and development effort.

17. The mission team also met with Ramiro Lopes da Silva, Resident Coordinator of the United Nations, who briefed the team on the wider ongoing United Nations needs assessment activities for Iraq. He expressed support for the integration of the findings and recommendations of the UNODC fact finding mission in the overall United Nations needs assessment.

### **III. POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT**

18. In May 2003, following the overthrow of the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, the CPA was established in Iraq. A Governing Council comprising 25 representatives, including three women, of various ethnic, religious and political interests in Iraq was subsequently established in July 2003. The process towards democratic government is progressing with plans to conduct elections in 2004.

19. Both the long period of authoritarian rule as well as the prolonged periods of conflict that the country has experienced over the past two decades, have combined to ensure that the criminal justice system is not in a position to respond to the challenges of maintaining the rule of law in post-conflict Iraq. The immediate period after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was characterised by significant levels of insecurity, public disorder, looting and increased levels of serious and violent crime, including indications of the growth of organised crime.

20. As indicated in paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2003/715), prepared in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), security remains the priority concern of all Iraqis. Security, or the lack of it, affects every aspect of life in Iraq in a fundamental way. This insecurity is a hindrance to progress in all sectors of activity from basic personal security and freedom of movement to the reopening of the banks and economic development, reform of the legal system, developing free and independent media and providing a stable environment for the political process towards democracy to occur.

21. In paragraphs 8 (h) and 8 (i) of Security Council Resolution 1483, the Council requests the Secretary-General to act in coordination with the CPA in assisting the people of Iraq through encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force and encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform.

22. In response to this resolution, the Secretary-General recommended that the focus of the United Nations action in Iraq, for the remainder of 2003, will include *inter alia* advising on

training curricula, and conducting training for civil servants, law enforcement and judicial personnel in particular. The Secretary-General also recommended that assistance in respect of judicial and legal reform and police training and reconstruction as well as reform of correctional systems should be included.

23. With the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1500 (2003), Sergio de Mello indicated to the mission team that he wished the UNODC to be included in UNAMI given that crime prevention, criminal justice and drug control issues will form an integral part of the programme of assistance to be provided by the UN.

24. It is planned that on 24 October 2003 a Donor's Conference on the Reconstruction of Iraq will take place in Madrid, Spain. In preparation for this Conference the United Nations has undertaken a number of needs assessment missions, notably in the area of institutional strengthening and the rule of law. As agreed with the SRSG and the Resident Coordinator, the relevant sections and recommendations of the UNODC report will be integrated into an overall United Nations needs assessment report for Iraq.

## **IV. ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING**

### **A. Evolving nature of organized crime**

25. The mission is not aware of any comprehensive assessment of organized crime in contemporary Iraq. The overview presented below contains a consolidation of data received from a number of interviews, meetings, travel inside the country and documentary sources. While many interviews provided relatively detailed information about the nature of criminal activity in specific places or in relation to the smuggling of specific commodities, much benefit would be obtained from a more comprehensive assessment of the problem across the country, including through the building of a systematic approach in the medium term to collecting and consolidating information on organized crime and drug trafficking throughout the country.

26. The nature of organized crime and associated trafficking in Iraq continues to evolve. It consists of a complex mix between old smuggling networks established under the previous regime to avoid sanctions as well as the growth of new forms of trafficking. Currently, the smuggling of a number of commodities must be viewed with serious concern in Iraq. However, the process of smuggling in specific areas, as well as those involved, is not new. The team was informed that the former regime was said to have encouraged smuggling in order to avoid the UN sanctions that were applied on Iraq. A "smuggling mafia" with strong connections to the old regime has thus continued to function. Given now that parts of Iraq are not under the effective control accompanied by lack of security, new forms of smuggling and new perpetrators have emerged.

27. Under Saddam's rule some forms of smuggling – most notably in oil – was effectively 'legitimised' by the state to ensure revenues while sanctions were in place. Such smuggling was however controlled by a small elite close to Saddam himself and its profits were often used directly for their own enrichment. At the same time, the regime turned a blind eye to other forms of smuggling, most notably amongst tribes sympathetic to Saddam. In this way the actions of the

regime ensured the unofficial distribution of resources through the development of a system of illicit patronage.

28. After the fall of the old regime new forms of criminality emerged as the systems of power, control and resource distribution collapsed. Tribal groups alienated from the previous regime have used the opportunity to obtain economic resources through illicit activities, including smuggling. New criminal networks have emerged to take advantage of the absence of state authority and have engaged in a multiplicity of violent activities, including kidnapping for extortion and theft of vehicles at gunpoint, known as 'car-jacking'. This has been greatly facilitated by the release of over 30,000 of Iraq's prisoners, many of whom were members of urban gangs, in an October 2002 amnesty by the old regime. This has added to the growth of criminality on the streets as hardened criminals have taken advantage of the absence of authority, the easy availability of firearms and the presence of new criminal opportunities.

29. The effective exclusion of many members of the former regime from the institutions of the new order have also ensured the growth in illicit activity, aimed not only to acquire profit but also as a mechanism to undercut the establishment of democracy. Such individuals, particularly when they have been drawn from the security and intelligence services, are in a position to put their training, connections and resources to illicit use. There is already significant evidence that the activities of smuggling groups are well organized, making use of sophisticated communications technologies, information gathering techniques as well as being actively engaged in corrupting state officials. Several reports were also received suggesting that criminal groups are making use of existing cross-border connections and are in the process of developing new ones, indicating the potential for growth between criminal activities in Iraq and linkages with transnational criminal networks.

30. This combination of factors suggests that the nature of organized criminality in Iraq is a combination of old and relatively sophisticated smuggling groups and new emerging criminal networks which have grown rapidly in scale and operations. This complex *and still evolving* political economy of illicit activity, and the enormous profits it generates, is leading to the consolidation of criminal organizations in the country.

31. Available information suggests that while current and emerging criminal groups in Iraq may often engage in multiple activities, an adequate understanding of the illicit economy must entail a more detailed examination of various criminal markets, most notably the smuggling of particular high value commodities such as oil and copper. The smuggling of these commodities as well as other criminal activities where there is evidence of organized criminal activity are discussed below in more detail.

### ***Oil theft and smuggling***

32. Of all the commodities smuggled in Iraq the highest profits are to be made from the illicit transportation and sale of oil. Given that the price of oil in Iraq is artificially cheap (5 cents a litre) huge profits can be made by selling fuel to buyers outside of the country. Military officials in the south of the country who have been attempting to track the phenomenon of oil smuggling, estimate that the smuggling of fuel to Iran results in profits of 500 percent and that to the United Arab Emirates in profits of 3000 percent. By way of example, it is now estimated that 3 million litres of diesel leave Iraq illegally every day.

33. The smuggling of fuel is conducted by a diversity of criminal operations ranging from highly organized groups to lower level criminal entrepreneurs. The most sophisticated smuggling operations are based on those used by the former regime to smuggle fuel in avoidance of UN sanctions. These networks, made up mainly of former senior officials close to Saddam or his sons, continue to exist, although the nature of their operations have changed to avoid detection by Coalition Forces. It must be emphasised that at the top end of the oil smuggling enterprise, neither the routes used, nor those involved, are recent. Interviews suggested that some of the key figures engaged in smuggling are not drawn from the south of the country where the majority of operations take place, but are from around Baghdad and the north of Iraq.

34. At a lower level, the smuggling of fuel is perpetrated by a diversity of less well organized groups often with strong tribal affiliations. In such cases, fuel is often acquired directly by puncturing pipelines, with the stolen fuel either being sold directly on the black market in Iraq where profits are modest, or smuggled out of the country for sale externally. Such operations appear to have grown in the period after the fall of the regime, as individual entrepreneurs and tribal groups have taken advantage of the resulting period of disorder.

35. The most sophisticated oil smuggling operations acquire their fuel directly from source, either through the corruption or involvement of officials or by diverting road tankers on their route from refineries. Oil is transported to the coast where it is smuggled from a variety of makeshift jetties along the coast line between Umm Quasr and Al Faw. While Iraqi officials interviewed suggested that some fuel smuggling also took place in formal ports at night, the majority of fuel is transferred through this system of make-shift jetties. Coalition officials report that when dismantled, such jetties simply reappear elsewhere. At least one port, Abuflus, was evidently built specifically by Saddam for smuggling, and Iraqi officials suggest that it continues to be used for this purpose, although to a declining extent. Oil is transported on a variety of vessels, with the most sophisticated operations involving the movement of the commodity on smaller vessels and barges to tankers waiting at sea.

36. Effective control over the vast road tanker fleet used to transport fuel, as well as securing the length of the pipelines running from refineries to the coast, remain key challenges for the Coalition Forces if smuggling is to be brought under effective control. The decline in fishing stocks in the Gulf has ensured that there are a large number of vessels and small time operators eager to acquire a profit. Fishing boats have been converted to carry fuel, or are simply loaded with jerry cans. In larger smuggling operations such small craft transfer fuel out to waiting ships, while in smaller scale initiatives fishing boats may be used directly to transport the fuel.

37. One complicating factor is that vessels engaged in smuggling cross easily into Iranian waters – the international boundary between Iran and Iraq running along the middle of the Al Faw Peninsula – making effective interdiction difficult. It should be emphasised that the external distribution network for oil is truly multinational; a tanker recently seized by a Coalition naval vessel had links to at least four countries.

38. As outlined, the profits to be made from oil smuggling have reinforced both the activities of those former regime members who have been engaged in the activity for some time, as well as the emergence of more recent and lower level smuggling operations. A full intelligence picture of the nature of the fuel smuggling industry is only now emerging, with it being clear that those involved constitute a complex and often overlapping network of former sanctions avoidance networks, tribal groups and individual entrepreneurs.

39. It is worth noting that some concern exists that effective actions taken by the Coalition Forces to stem oil smuggling activities may result in these smuggling networks turning their attention to other illicit commodities including drug trafficking.

### ***Copper theft and smuggling***

40. The team was informed that one of the few positive achievements of the former regime of Saddam Hussein was to invest heavily in infrastructure, including in the construction of an extensive network for power distribution. Given that there are no natural copper deposits in the Middle East, the theft of copper from the power network and its smuggling has developed into a profitable enterprise. Copper is said to now fetch an estimated \$17,000 a ton in the countries bordering Iraq.

41. What is perhaps most remarkable about the process of copper smuggling in Iraq is how quickly it has developed in the post-war period. Both Iraqi and Coalition officials agree that the extent of smuggling under Saddam was limited by harsh penalties and by a complex system of patronage that ensured that local tribal groups provided protection to the infrastructure in the areas of their influence and control. These disincentives to engaging in the theft and smuggling of copper have now been removed. The process of copper theft and smuggling has now reached “industrial scale” proportions according to senior officials.

42. Copper is looted from power lines after pylons are pulled over using grappling hooks. The mission team saw for themselves numerous felled pylons across both the south, centre and north of the country. Insulation is melted off the lines, the copper stripped out and taken to smelters and turned into ingots. The felling of live power lines is both an extremely dangerous practice for those involved, but also, and most critically, has been disruptive of the already aging and vulnerable power distribution network in Iraq. The reduction of power services to the population has led to increased tension, protests and disturbances, undermining Coalition efforts to return the country to normality.

43. Coalition intelligence reports suggest that specific groups, including those with a close link to particular tribes, are now heavily involved in the practice. The scale of copper theft and smuggling cannot be underestimated. One truck was recently seized leaving Baghdad loaded with 9 tons of copper ingots. Such ingots are smuggled to Iran and sold for an average of 10 dollars per kilogram. Weak border controls and porous borders facilitate the transfer of copper out of the country. Copper smuggling is reported to be concentrated along the Iranian border in the south east of the country.

44. In a short space of time, copper theft and smuggling have developed into a full scale and increasingly highly organized criminal enterprise. Again, the intelligence picture of the full extent of those involved is only now emerging, but it appears that as in the case of oil smuggling a highly organized element may also be accompanied by lower level and more spontaneous operations that sell stolen cable on to those engaged in smelting operations.

45. Similar to oil smuggling, this form of organized criminal activity has a direct impact on efforts to stabilize the country as it disrupts the electricity supply. Nevertheless, protecting the power lines is proving to be an onerous task. Power lines run for hundreds of kilometres through uninhabited areas and the criminal groups engaged make frequent use of violence and

intimidation to protect their activities. During the period of the mission team's visit to Iraq a Danish soldier was killed when a group engaged in pulling down power lines was confronted.

### ***Trafficking in firearms and light weapons***

46. Evidence in respect of the trafficking of firearms to and from Iraq remains fragmentary. While Coalition Forces continue to seize weapons and firearms at various locations in Iraq, no significant seizures have been made at border crossing points. It must be emphasised that effective search procedures are only now being implemented.

47. It is clear that there is a significant domestic market for firearms within Iraq itself with considerable amounts of weaponry being trafficked and sold internally. The availability of large numbers of firearms presents a direct threat not only to internal peace and security but also promotes the easy access to, and use of, firearms by the criminal fraternity. Given this, significant efforts have been made by the Coalition Forces to find and seize illegal weapons caches. Important progress has also been made with large quantities of weapons having been found. The problem remains, however, that many of the weapons issued to the military and police by the former regime are not accounted for, although evidence suggests that at least in the case of the police many of these firearms were in poor condition.

### ***Trafficking in human beings***

48. Evidence of the nature and extent of human trafficking in Iraq is difficult to ascertain. Many such cases go unreported given that powerful traditions and norms prevent the victims from coming forward.

49. The police and Coalition Authorities indicate that they have not been able to obtain clear evidence that this practice is occurring extensively, although reports have been received of this type of activity along the north-eastern border. In the case of the Iraqi police, where the interests of women victims have been sorely neglected, a significant shift in emphasis and attitude, as well as the appointment of women police officers, is a prerequisite to obtaining a clearer understanding of the problem.

50. It should be noted, however, that the rapid and alarming growth in the number of reported kidnappings since the fall of the regime where young women are often reported to be the victim, suggests that a connection exists between kidnapping and trafficking in human beings. While the mission team did not directly hear evidence of such cases, police investigators in Baghdad have reported to Human Rights Watch that criminal groups who specialize in kidnapping girls who are then sold for purposes of sexual exploitation to various Gulf states do exist. The same report also suggested, as was clear from the mission's team own experience, that the police are poorly equipped to deal with the problem.

51. The mission team's assessment is that trafficking in human beings is indeed occurring, although on current information it is impossible to determine the overall extent of the problem. The potential for a growth of human trafficking from Iraq is clear given poor economic conditions, the weak social status of many women and the development of increasingly powerful criminal networks.

### ***The theft and trafficking of cultural artefacts***

52. Considerable media coverage has been given to the specific issue of the theft of and trafficking in Iraqi cultural artefacts stolen during the period of looting after the fall of the regime. Interviews suggest that the scale of the loss is less serious than first anticipated as about 85 percent of museum pieces previously thought to have been stolen were removed for safekeeping by museum staff days before the looting began.

53. The Commission appointed to investigate the matter now estimates that 3400 pieces were stolen or looted. Approximately 1200 pieces have since been returned after calls from religious institutions, and an amnesty being granted to all those who came forward with such items. About 2200 pieces are still missing, with these consisting of about 48 pieces of high value. The Art Theft Unit of the Italian Carabinieri have been involved in compiling and circulating notices with the description of the most valuable items and investigations into the thefts continue.

54. Despite earlier reports to this effect, the extent to which organized criminal networks were involved in the theft of cultural artefacts remains difficult to determine, although it is clear now that the degree of loss, while of concern, is less serious than was first anticipated. Apart from the museums, archaeological sites continue to be vulnerable and looted as effective protection and security are not yet adequate.

### ***Other forms of smuggling***

55. Information obtained by the mission team suggests that smuggling activities also included a large number of other commodities. These include animals – primarily sheep and camels – as well as cigarettes, wool, foodstuff and stolen goods. Smuggling across the Iran/Iraq border by tribal groups has been well developed for some time, and was encouraged by the 20 percent tax on imported goods imposed by the previous regime. The legal status of about 200,000 people living along this border who were never granted Iraqi nor Iranian citizenship, and who move freely across the border, has also contributed to the unregulated movement of goods across the frontier between the two countries.

56. It should be noted that since the CPA has stated that border tariffs will not be instituted until the end of 2003, some of these activities cannot technically be described as smuggling. Iraqi officials indicated however that in most cases such smuggling activities were not new and had occurred under the previous regime. For example, the team was informed that cigarette smuggling in the Saddam era was organized by individuals close to Saddam's son, Uday. It is likely therefore that such smuggling will continue.

57. The transfer of two types of illicit commodities have occurred on a large scale since the fall of the regime. The first is the smuggling of considerable quantities of scrap metal out of Iraq. Coalition Forces in the north-east of the country report that large loads of scrap metal often also contain quantities of military material, including unexploded ordinance. The second form of smuggling relates to motor vehicles which were either stolen or hijacked or were issued as government vehicles and have now been transported out of Iraq.

### ***Kidnapping with extortion***

58. The growth of the number of kidnappings involving extortion in post-conflict Iraq must be viewed with great concern. Kidnapping has become a crime viewed in the eyes of many ordinary Iraqis as symbolic of the insecurity under which they live. A significant proportion of kidnappings are carried out by relatively large number of armed individuals who invade the homes of their victims. It should be emphasised that state sanctioned kidnapping was condoned under the previous regime as a means of dealing with any individuals who expressed opposition to the *status quo*. It was thus suggested to the mission team that members of the former regime's security forces could be playing a part in kidnapping activities given their previous 'expertise' in this area.

59. Determining the actual extent of the problem of kidnapping is difficult as it is likely that only a proportion of cases are reported to the authorities given the low levels of trust of the police in many areas. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that the problem is assuming serious proportions. In the southern town of Basrah, for example, where Coalition Forces have begun a more systematic analysis of the nature of the problem, 30 cases of kidnapping have been recorded since May 2003. Another 18 cases have also come to the attention of the military authorities, although no direct reports have been made in these cases. In Baghdad, the US 18 Military Police Brigade recorded 24 cases of kidnapping over a thirty day period in July and August. The same data set indicated that 7 percent of all reported crimes in July were kidnappings, although such a figure is perhaps more illustrative of the currently low levels of reporting of all crimes to the authorities than the actual extent of kidnapping itself.

60. Both military and Iraqi officials interviewed are of the view that the practice of kidnapping is committed primarily for profit with no political motivations involved. In cases where local political figures or other notables were kidnapped the primary motive has largely been the ability of the victim or their families to pay the ransom. Available information suggested that ransoms of up to \$50 000 had been demanded in Basrah.

61. Some successes have recently been registered in the fight against kidnapping with two criminal groups that engaged in the practice being broken up by the Major Crimes Unit in Baghdad. Such cases, according to police officials interviewed, illustrate the extent to which kidnapping is carried out by relatively well organized groups who are primarily interested in profit. In order to achieve a full understanding of the problem, a comprehensive assessment of the nature and extent of kidnapping across the country should be conducted along with any assessment of organized crime.

### ***Other violent crimes***

62. Interviews with both police officials and Coalition military officers indicate dramatic increases in all forms of violent criminal activity in the post-war period. These include murder, car-jacking and armed robbery. For example, the 18 Military Police Brigade in Baghdad recorded 100 murders over a thirty day period in July and August 2003. The same period also saw 168 cases of car theft, the majority of which were reported to be car-jackings. Cases of rape and assault have also been reported to the authorities, with these two violent crime categories constituting approximately 22 percent of all reported incidents in July 2003.

63. Those in the Coalition responsible for collecting and collating this data caution against drawing any firm conclusions about recent increases or decreases in crime levels given that no previous data exists and it is difficult to determine the proportion of all crimes that are reported. Successes by the Coalition Forces in rebuilding the Iraqi police may increase rather than reduce the levels of reporting.

64. The degree that such crimes are related to organized crime is open to speculation, although in the particular cases of car-jacking some degree of organization is likely to exist in order to select the vehicles to be targeted and then to smuggle them out of the country. Local police interviewed at a police station in Baghdad suggested that in their jurisdictional area of responsibility several criminal groups operated which actively engaged in kidnappings, murder and car-jacking.

65. The use of violence and intimidation by criminal networks and groups to facilitate their activities does however appear to be relatively widespread. Several cases were recounted to the mission team, including at the Port of Umm Quasr where Coalition military officials suggested that threats of violence were used with regularity to access the port facilities to facilitate smuggling.

### ***The links between organized crime and terrorism***

66. In different parts of the world, experience shows that there are links between terrorism and organized crime. In order to prevent the further development of situations of lawlessness in which terrorist groups may thrive using the support of organized crime, effective counter-measures must be devised. Judging from the situation of the evolution of organized crime in Iraq, the team was informed by several sources that links between those engaged in criminal activities and terrorist acts exist. It should be noted however that there is a need to study such links, including drug trafficking, money laundering, illicit trafficking of arms and corruption, which provide an enabling environment for terrorist operations to expand and continue to threaten peace and security in Iraq. It should also be emphasised that in its resolution S/RES/1373 (2001), the Security Council noted with concern the close connection between international terrorism and these forms of crime.

67. The vast majority of governments provided information to the Counter Terrorism Committee of the Security Council in response to Security Council Resolution 1373 on the prevention and suppression of terrorism. Many governments indicated action on adopting new laws and on assessing the capabilities of their institutions to fight terrorism including the former Government of Iraq. It is expected that the new Iraqi Government will consider updating its existing laws related to combating terrorism, including its links to organized crime.

## **B. The growing potential for drug trafficking and abuse**

### ***Drug trafficking***

68. Drug trafficking is gradually finding its way into and transiting through Iraq. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the former regime was encouraging drug trafficking through Iraq for political motivation, in particular for destabilizing the north-east Kurdish area, and for financial interest with the local tribes in the south-east of the country. No figure revealing the extent of this illicit activity has been provided to the mission and the information collected is vague at this

stage. Nevertheless, certain trends identified underscore the potential seriousness of this phenomenon.

69. As in the case of organized crime, all the ingredients are present to support the expansion of drug trafficking and abuse in Iraq. The collapse of law and order and the disintegration of the justice system manifested in other similar post-conflict situations will inevitably feed the criminal environment. Furthermore, as outlined above, the organized smuggling legitimized by Saddam Hussein's regime is today perpetuated by well-organized criminal networks which will use their long-standing criminal international linkages with neighbouring countries and beyond to develop a lucrative market.

70. In addition, the geographic location of Iraq and its proximity to the transit countries of opium and heroin – originating primarily from Afghanistan – from Iran to Turkey, or from Iran to the Gulf States place it at serious risk from increased drug trafficking and abuse.

71. Afghanistan is today the world's largest opium producing country. Annual production was estimated at 3,400 metric tonnes in 2002, constituting 75 percent of the total global opium output. During the last two decades, Iran was affected most by opium trafficking. Iranian opium seizures showed a nine-fold increase between 1990 and 2000. In 2001, Iran seized on its territory 81 metric tonnes of opium and 12 metric tonnes of morphine.

72. The Iranian authorities identified some 90 points of entry of opiates from Afghanistan to Khorassan province (bordering Afghanistan and Turkmenistan) and some 50 points of entry between Afghanistan/Pakistan and the Iranian province of Sistan & Baluchistan. The main exit points are border crossings along the Turkish border and Iran's southern coast.

73. In 2001 Turkey seized 261 kg of opium and 5.2 tonnes of morphine and heroin while Saudi Arabia reported the seizures of 179 kg of morphine and heroin and United Arab Emirates 40 kg originating from Afghanistan via Iran's Bandar-Abbas port.

74. It is noteworthy that the south-western border province of Iran with Iraq, Khozestan, is recorded as the 6<sup>th</sup> ranking of Iranian provinces in terms of the highest rate of people arrested for drug abuse in the year 2000. The availability of drugs in that province suggest that drug trafficking and abuse could spread to the Iraqi side of the border.

75. At present daily seizures of hashish, or heroin, are being made in Iraq by the Coalition Force and one large seizure of 500 kg of hashish was recently reported in Al Amarah province.

76. The country's vulnerability towards drug trafficking is particularly sensitive in two specific locations:

- Firstly, the north-eastern borders with Turkey and Iran in the Kurdistan region. The length of the border with Turkey is about 600 km and is 400 km long with Iran from Erbil province to As Sulaymaniyah. The team was informed by local officials that drug trafficking has a long history in the mountainous border of the region, although the last seizures of morphine go back to the mid-nineties. No evidence of the existence of processing laboratories in this zone has ever been reported.
- Secondly, the Marsh Arab area in the east and the south-eastern border with Iran. Formerly this area constituted a natural barrier with marshes being difficult to cross. The marshes were however drained by Saddam resulting an area along the border which is

now relatively easy to traverse. Facilitated by local tribal groups, drug smuggling seems to be flourishing in this part of the country. Drugs are then exported either by sea from the Umm Qasr Port facilities to Gulf countries or by land to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

### ***Drug abuse***

77. The drug abuse situation is not yet serious in Iraq. Nevertheless, certain indicators suggest that there is an emerging problem of abuse with the potential for further dramatic growth. There appear to have been three major factors – social, religious and legal – which have in the past served to constrain the development of drug abuse. Historically, the social norms of Iraqi society strictly prohibited drug use. This was supported by religious teachings and a harsh legal regime including the sentence of capital punishment for drug trafficking and serious penalties for drug abuse. Nevertheless, drug addiction occurred to a limited extent but remained largely hidden.

78. Drug dealers that used to carry out their activities in a covert way now sell their wares in open market settings. In the immediate aftermath of the war, there was widespread looting of pharmacies, clinics and hospitals. Huge quantities of stimulant and depressant drugs were stolen and are currently being trafficked throughout the country. There is serious concern that once these supplies are exhausted there is the potential for those addicted to turn to seek out other sources of supply.

79. The Iraqi police have reported to the CPA that hashish, heroin, stimulant and depressant pills are now being sold in various areas of Baghdad. There are similar reports relating to Basrah and Kerbala.

80. The drug phenomenon appears to have grown substantially in the major cities of Iraq. Reports from Ibn-Rushd Teaching Mental Hospital, the sole centre for management of substance abuse in Iraq, point to a rise in consumption, particularly in substances such as Benzhexol and Benzodiazepines. The number of patients seeking drug treatment has doubled in the five month period between February and July 2003 (112 and 233 respectively, according to WHO in Baghdad).

81. The currently low prevalence of drug abuse in Iraq should not be a cause for complacency. On the contrary, to understand the pervasive effects of how quickly a drug economy can develop, the situation in Central Asia is illustrative. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union there was little evidence of drug abuse in Central Asia. The problem of drug abuse was at that time insignificant or similar to the one encountered today in Iraq. Ten years later the problem in the Central Asian states has reached serious levels of drug addiction and HIV/AIDS.

82. The number of drug users registered in Central Asia showed an exponential growth, more than tripling between 1992 and 2000. For example, in Tajikistan 300 drug addicts were registered in 1992, not dissimilar to the current figures for Iraq in 2003. Tajikistan subsequently experienced a seven fold increase in registered drug abusers over the 1992 to 2000 period.

83. More worrying, data for 2001 suggests that 88% of all newly recorded HIV cases in Central Asia were related to injecting drug use (IDU). Transmission of HIV by IDU is thus by far the most important route of HIV transmission in Central Asia. The IDU related HIV transmission expressed as a proportion of total HIV transmission in Central Asia (88% in 2001) is significantly higher than in Iran (67%) or Western Europe.

84. Neighbouring Iran has also developed a serious problem of drug abuse with Government reports of a level of over one million drug dependent individuals. These comparisons suggest that Iraq is not immune from the growth of drug abuse and that a proactive preventive approach towards this emerging phenomenon in the form of a sustained awareness campaign will be necessary in the medium term.

85. According to Iraqi health officials consulted, several factors could lead to drug addiction. Among others, these include, personality disorders related to post-traumatic stress exacerbated by the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein and decades of war, as well as poor socio-economic conditions.

86. Very few treatment facilities are available with the required medical expertise in the country to address this new drug abuse problem. Equally, of serious concern is the complete absence in the Iraqi penal code of provisions related to the medical treatment of drug addicts under judicial control.

87. In the ongoing recovery and reconstruction efforts for Iraq, past experience and lessons learned in other post-conflict situations should be an integral part of the overall strategy designed to control and minimise drug trafficking and abuse.

## **V. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING**

88. The following section contains a brief descriptive overview of the legal and institutional framework, focussing on the criminal justice system as well as the status of various legal instruments pertaining to combating organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.

### **A. Legal framework**

89. The period since the 1958 revolution witnessed interim constitutions, the last one of which was enacted in 1970. It is an established fact that Iraq had in the past a well established legal system. Historically, the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958, resulted in abrogating the 1925 constitution. Prior to the Baath Party taking power, the judicial system had largely enjoyed integrity and independence. The Superior Council of Judges decided on questions of appointments, promotions, transfers and disciplines of judges.

90. The legal system contains various codes and acts, including the Penal Code 1971, 1969, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1971, the Judiciary Act of 1979 and the Prosecutions Act of 1979, the Civil Code of 1951, the Commercial Code of 1984, the Civil Procedure Code of 1969 and the Code of Personal Status of 1959.

#### **■ Organized Crime Convention**

91. Iraq has not signed nor ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols. The Convention will enter into force on 29 September 2003. Given the level of organized crime as outlined above, as well as its growing international

connections, the ratification of the Convention and its Protocol will signify a critical step in the fight against organized crime in the country.

#### ■ Drug Conventions

92. Iraq is party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In response to its obligations to international drug conventions, Iraq enacted Law No. 68 of 1965 on Narcotic Drugs. The team was not provided with any additional information on drug laws enacted during the period after 1965. The team was informed that according to existing Iraqi laws, drug trafficking is punished with the death penalty. An assessment of the degree to which current legislation is in compliance with the various provisions of the Drug Conventions to which Iraq is a party is required.

#### ■ Universal Instruments against Terrorism

93. Iraq is party to five of the twelve universal instruments for the prevention of suppression of international terrorism. These are: the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Lawful Seizure of Aircraft; the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; and, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. In addition, Iraq signed the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. Iraq should be encouraged to ratify the other instruments, particularly the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the 1999 International Convention for the Financing of Terrorism.

94. It should be noted that the former Government of Iraq transmitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council a supplementary report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) in which it indicated the various laws applicable to combat terrorism (see S/2002/943). It is recommended that the new Iraqi Government should review existing legal and operational arrangements with a view to responding more comprehensively to the Security Council resolution particularly with regard to becoming party to the remaining seven international instruments related to terrorism. In addition, to supplement its anti-terrorist actions, the new Government of Iraq may wish to speed up the process of signature and ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

#### ■ Prevention of crimes that infringe on the cultural heritage of Iraq in the form of movable property

95. In recognition of the importance for Iraq to preserve its cultural heritage by protecting it from illicit import, export and theft and in response to the recommendation of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Government of Iraq should be encouraged, when concluding relevant agreements with other states, to make use of the United Nations Model Treaty for the Prevention of Crimes that Infringe on the Cultural Heritage of Peoples in the Form of Moveable Property.

## **B. Institutional framework**

### *A brief overview of the past nature of the Iraqi criminal justice system*

96. The role of the national police in Iraq was greatly affected during the period of Saddam's regime. The applicable laws, which governed the police operations were the Penal Code and the Law on Criminal Proceedings and related amendments. In spite of the fact that police academies were established to upgrade police skills, the objective of ensuring police functions with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were undermined. One of the most serious actions taken by the Baath Party was the militarisation of the police and the creation of security structures to protect the regime. This situation resulted in circumventing the role of the national police, the absence of public trust and the spread of bribery and corruption among the police forces. The role of the national police was further downgraded due to low salaries and the general decline in the standard of living.

97. When Saddam Hussein became the president of Iraq in 1969, a number of laws were passed to amend the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the laws governing the judiciary. The Revolutionary Command Council enacted decrees by which special courts or exceptional courts, special police and military courts were established, the functions of which did not fall within the purview of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Revolutionary Command Council also passed a decree granting immunity for all of its members and all Iraqi judges and prosecutors had to be approved by the Baath Party. As a result, the role of the judiciary was undermined. There was no respect for the due process of law.

98. The integrity of the judicial system was further aggravated by increasing the role of the military courts and the special courts and the interventions of the Baath Party officials. The policy of widespread and systematic violations targeting regime opponents, specific ethnic groups and the judiciary made it difficult for the conduct of proper trials. Arbitrary arrests and detention and the constant violation of human rights and civil liberties were pursued and physical and moral coercion were extensively exercised to obtain confession. At times when the independence of the judiciary is expected to be guaranteed by the State, the regime of Saddam Hussein exercised excessive and inappropriate interference with the judicial process, to the extent that judicial decisions were revised or abrogated.

99. Information provided by local officials revealed that attempts had been made by the prosecutors to perform their duties fairly by contributing to due process of law and the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system. The role of the prosecution was however marginalized. The prosecutors involvement in criminal proceedings, including the investigation of crime, follow-up on the execution of court decisions and other related functions was undermined by the security establishments and interference of other regime officials.

100. Given the fragile security situation in many parts of Iraq, the team was unable to conduct site visits of any prisons or detention facilities. Information available indicates that the conditions of prisons differed from one location to the other. While in major cities prisons existed with basic requirements and facilities, in other locations, only basic detention cells existed at police stations. In certain detention centres, the basic principles for the treatment of prisoners were not fully

respected by the former regime, particularly for political prisoners. At those centres, the use of torture and other cruel and inhuman or degrading punishment were practiced.

***The institutional capacities of the police to counter organized crime and drug trafficking***

101. Rebuilding the Iraqi Police Force (IPF) is considered as a major and urgent priority by the CPA and Governing Council in their efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq. An initial assessment carried out in May 2003 by a team of international policing experts provided an indication of the parlous state of the Iraqi police.

102. In the security vacuum after the war many police stations were damaged and looted. Vehicles and equipment were stolen. Information technology systems were damaged and criminal records destroyed. Historically, the Iraqi police suffered from years of neglect under the former regime. During the period of international isolation officers have not had the opportunity to be exposed to modern policing methods. As a result, the police are poorly trained, lack equipment, basic policing skills and are viewed as generally ineffective. They are also regarded with distrust by large sections of the populace.

103. The CPA has established a small International Policing Team within the Ministry of the Interior to lead and coordinate efforts to restructure and rebuild the Iraqi police. The Ministry of the Interior is also responsible for developing the Customs and Border Control Directorates. The Senior Policy Adviser, a former US police commissioner, heads the team. A senior UK police officer has been appointed as mentor to the chief of the police in Baghdad. In the southern region of Iraq, two UK Ministry of Defence police officers and three Danish police officers are assisting in implementing the Iraqi Police Transition Integration Programme (IPTIP) as well as supporting other policing initiatives. An additional senior UK police officer is to join this team shortly.

104. In support of the policing team the military Coalition Force have assisted in various ways. This includes the provision of expertise by the Italian Carabinieri in combating organized crime and kidnapping and the establishment of a specialized unit in Basrah for intelligence gathering and operational coordination. This does not appear to involve the Iraqi police.

Progress made:

105. The police team has made positive interventions in a number of areas. They include the following:

- A significant number of police stations in Baghdad and in other parts of the country have been rebuilt, renovated and made operational. Many Iraqi police officers have been recalled to duty and provided with essential equipment. Operational patrols have commenced in a limited way. Policing activities such as traffic duty have re-commenced.
- A Major Crime Unit with a remit to tackle the growing problem of serious crime has been established in Baghdad. The Unit with an establishment of some 50 staff has been provided with vehicles, communications and other operational equipment.
- Prior to the war the police were poorly paid and a culture of corruption evidently prevailed. To address the problem, the salaries of police officers have been increased significantly in an effort to remove the incentive to accept bribes. Additionally a small Internal Affairs Unit to tackle police corruption and investigate complaints against the police has been formed.

- A Joint Co-ordination Centre has been established to ensure that operational activities between the police and military are carried out in a coordinated manner.
- Training of Iraqi Police officers has commenced. The Iraqi Police Transition Integration Programme (IPTIP) is a three week basic foundation course which all officers have to attend. This is based upon attaining international standards for human rights and modern police patrol procedures. To date two courses have been held in Baghdad and two in Mosul in the northern region. Some 120-150 officers received training on each one of these courses.

Future requirements:

106. Although general policing was not within the terms of reference of the UNODC mission it is felt appropriate to highlight a number of concerns which it is hoped may be helpful to the CPA and Governing Council.

- Future organizational structure of the IPF

107. At this stage it is not clear if the new IPF is to be based on a Federal, Regional or Governorate system. A priority must be to reach a decision on the future organizational structure of the IPF and develop a strategic plan for rebuilding the police.

- Development of capacity to investigate serious, organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism offences

108. As outlined previously, the recent upsurge in the number of serious crimes being committed, particularly in Baghdad, includes high levels of murder, kidnap for ransom, car-jackings, firearms offences, violent crimes, terrorism and other various forms of smuggling, particularly oil and copper.

109. Senior Iraqi police, judiciary and Coalition officials believe that many of these crimes are being committed by some of the convicted criminals released from prison in the October 2002 amnesty granted by the previous regime. Due to the breakdown in police infrastructure there is, in general, no ability to keep track of and monitor those released.

110. Trained, well equipped and professional staff working in effective units, making sound use of intelligence are needed to prevent and investigate serious criminality and to combat organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.

111. As mentioned previously, a Major Crime Unit was established in Baghdad by the CPA to respond to the growing problem of serious crime, however the current staff lack specialist skills and resources. In the longer term the unit will require additional staff and equipment. Staff training should include the planning and implementation of specialist operations; controlled delivery techniques; investigation of major crime; evidence gathering; mobile and static surveillance; covert intelligence gathering; undercover operations; electronic evidence gathering; witness protection; hostage negotiation; interview skills; and, the use of informants and intelligence. The unit will require appropriate equipment including radio communications, mobile phones, vehicles, motor cycles, binoculars, night vision equipment, narcotic and precursor test kits and computers.

112. Dependent on the future structure of the IPF it is recommended that consideration be given to establishing further specialist units to combat and investigate major crime, drug trafficking and terrorism in the northern and southern regions of the country.

■ Forensic/ scientific support

113. Investigators need to be supported by an adequate, modern forensic/scientific support capability which provides a range of services. These include, amongst others, detailed examination of major crime incidents, drug testing and analysis, examination of weapons, explosives, basic crime scene analysis, fingerprinting and photographic services.

114. It is understood that despite the damage caused to police buildings during the war and period of looting, some laboratory facilities remain. However, these are ill equipped to meet current and future needs. It was further established that there are a number of qualified people in this field but they will require further training and the provision of equipment to reach an appropriate level of effectiveness.

115. It is proposed that, dependent on the agreed police structure, consideration should be given to establishing police laboratories in the northern, central and southern regions of the country. This could possibly be accomplished by refurbishing and renovating the current facilities. However, a separate detailed needs assessment will be required to determine the resource, equipment and training requirements.

■ Assessment of organized crime

116. Although it is evident that there is a growing problem of organized crime in Iraq, the extent is by no means clear. It is proposed that a detailed assessment be carried out at the local, regional and national level to determine the scale of the problem. This baseline data will be the foundation for an ongoing database to assist the authorities in measuring progress, identify new crime trends and provide assistance in developing appropriate strategies to combat the problem.

■ Intelligence

117. A key component in preventing and investigating crime is the need for law enforcement agencies to have well organized systems for the gathering, evaluation, dissemination and use of criminal intelligence. There appear to be no formal systems in place and a weak understanding of an intelligence led approach to law enforcement, which allows for a more focused and effective deployment of resources. An urgent priority will be to set up basic intelligence systems to gather, record, analyse, disseminate and use information about criminals and crime groups. The same system and forms should be taken into use throughout the country. Training in intelligence led law enforcement should be implemented at senior management and operational level.

118. A longer term objective should be to establish a National Criminal Intelligence Unit (NCIU) which could serve as a focal point for all Iraqi law enforcement agencies. Such a unit would contain information and intelligence about major criminals, organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorist groups and ensure the coordination of specific operations. The NCIU could also serve as the national focal point for facilitating international information exchange and act as the coordinating body for joint actions with neighbouring states such as controlled delivery operations. The assessment of organized crime referred to above, could act as the foundation for

an ongoing database within the NCIU and used to compile periodic threat assessments in order to ensure a more proactive and focused approach to tackling organized crime.

#### ■ Basic police training

119. Despite the progress made, the Coalition International Policing Team face a formidable task. They lack adequate resources to ensure that the IPTIP programme progresses swiftly. Currently police training is being delivered in Baghdad and Mosul by US military personnel, many of whom are military reservists who are serving police officers in the US. It is evident that further trainers will be required if the training programmes are to be delivered swiftly and effectively. For example, around 35,000 Iraqi police officers have been recalled to duty. In Basrah some 10,000 officers have to be trained, however training has yet to commence due to the absence of a suitable and secure training building. The Police Academy in Basrah, along with those in Baghdad and Mosul, was badly damaged. All the academies are in the process of being rebuilt.

120. It should be emphasized that the IPTIP course is only designed to provide basic training. It will be necessary to provide specialist training for those officers selected to work in crime investigation, particularly organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and other specialist fields.

#### ■ Oversight and accountability

121. The focus by the CPA policing team on setting and maintaining high professional standards for the police is commendable. However after decades of suspicion and mistrust the public will need to be convinced that complaints against police will be properly investigated and that corruption will be tackled. The new Internal Affairs Unit currently has 8 staff. As confidence in the complaints system grows it is likely that further staff will be required.

122. It is proposed that consideration be given to establishing a formal Inspectorate to provide proper oversight of the new IPF. Initially this could be linked to the Internal Affairs Unit. The purpose would be to ensure police accountability, efficiency and effectiveness by identifying areas where performance could be improved and by promoting best practice and high professional standards. The oversight function should also contribute to developing public confidence in the police.

#### ■ The role of women in the police

123. There are no women in the police in Baghdad or Basrah. Whilst it is encouraging that some limited recruitment has taken place in the northern provinces of Dahuk and Erbil there is evidently little recognition of the important role which can be performed by women in carrying out a range of policing duties. These include uniform patrol, searching of female suspects, crime investigation, surveillance, covert intelligence gathering, dealing with rape and other sexual offences, investigating human trafficking, kidnapping and abduction domestic violence and scenes of crime examination. The valuable and important role which can be played by women in the police service needs to be addressed.

#### ***The institutional capacities of the customs and border authorities and proposed interventions***

124. Measures to prevent the development of organized crime, smuggling and drug trafficking will require the development of strong and effective controls along Iraq's borders. An assessment

of the Iraqi customs service was carried out by a team from the United Kingdom customs service in July 2003. Their report highlighted a series of recommendations to assist in the organizational development and areas of capacity building.

125. Customs and border controls are inadequate. Once a decision has been taken on the future structure of the Customs and Border Control Directorates, measures will be required to train customs officers and border guards and provide adequate operational equipment. Training should include: interdiction techniques; risk assessment; targeting and profiling; search techniques in respect of persons, baggage, vehicles and containers; and, management training.

126. The future development of effective customs and border control will require a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities. Integration of training of customs with other control agencies on whose behalf they are working at borders will enhance inter-agency cooperation. The promotion of better operational working would benefit from the establishment of a joint committee comprising customs and border control officials.

127. It is understood that prior to the war a number of trained dogs were available to assist the police. In this regard, there now appears to be no capacity for the police, customs or border control. The training of dogs for use by law enforcement in searching for drugs and explosives will serve to strengthen efforts to counter the smuggling of drugs and explosives, particularly at airports and other identified border control points. It is suggested that a dog training unit be established.

### ***Regional and international cooperation***

128. The international nature of drug trafficking and the fact that Iraq is increasingly being affected by organized crime will require Iraqi law enforcement agencies to develop effective information exchange and operational cooperation with counterparts in other countries. It would be beneficial to establish a national law enforcement focal point. As referred to earlier, a National Criminal Intelligence Unit (NCIU) could serve as such a focal point.

129. Measures should be considered to ensure that links are established with law enforcement agencies in neighbouring countries and with organizations such as ICPO-INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Cross-border meetings to exchange information and intelligence as well as seminars to discuss the development of joint operational activities such as controlled delivery should be considered. The development of effective international cooperative arrangements will not only benefit the Iraqi police and customs but also lead to an enhancement of law enforcement effectiveness in the region.

### ***Criminal justice reform with particular emphasis on the judiciary and prosecution***

130. In order to complement the assistance being provided by the CPA in the area of judicial reform, UNODC would be able to contribute, as far as countering organized crime and drug trafficking are concerned, to the training of judges and prosecutors and related officials, focussing on judicial integrity and the judicial and prosecutorial handling of complex organized crime cases.

131. It should be noted that restoring the rule of law in Iraq will require a strong, independent and accountable judiciary which enjoys public trust. UNODC has successfully assisted the judiciaries

of various countries in the development and implementation of judicial reform initiatives aimed at strengthening the integrity and capacity of the courts, enhancing access to justice, establishing accountability and oversight mechanisms, improving quality and timeliness of justice delivery and facilitating the coordination among all the components of the criminal justice system.

132. In order to address the accessibility of victims of crime and abuse of power to justice and fair treatment, there is need to implement the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (General Assembly resolution 4034). Given the vulnerability of victims as a result of the actions of organized criminal groups and the atrocities committed by the former regime against vulnerable individuals and groups, the issue of accessibility to justice as well as treatment, restitution, compensation and assistance to victims will have to be addressed.

### ***The use of international mentors***

133. The appointment of international experts to act as mentors to the police, customs, border control and prosecution service should be considered. This will be particularly appropriate in specialist crime investigation fields and the future prosecution of serious organized crime cases.

## **VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

134. The mission identified broad areas of intervention where UNODC could play a supportive and complementary role to the work that is currently carried out by, and on behalf of, the CPA and Governing Council. In this regard, the following recommendations are made:

### **A. Legal assistance**

1. Provide assistance to the Governing Council and the Ministry of Justice in drafting the legislation on drug control in compliance with United Nations Drug Conventions.
2. Assist in the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols on trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in firearms, including the establishment of a legal framework to fight organized crime. In particular, providing assistance in drafting a conspiracy law or criminal association law.
3. Assist in putting in place appropriate regulations and standards to regulate firearms.
4. Assist in the process of ratifying and implementing the 12 universal instruments against terrorism, particularly the most recent Conventions on terrorist bombing and the financing of terrorism. It is recommended that such assistance should address the drafting of a criminal association law.
5. Assist in the drafting of legislation on money laundering.
6. Assist in the drafting of legislation addressing the accessibility of victims of crime and abuse of power to justice, fair treatment, restitution, compensation and assistance, in response to the principles contained in the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (General Assembly resolution 4034).
7. Train key actors, particularly judges and prosecutors, in implementing new laws.
8. Assist in establishing regulations and standards for the restitution and return of movable property forming part of the cultural heritage of the Iraqi people.

## **B. Institution and capacity building**

### Law enforcement:

1. Subject to the agreed organizational structure and policing strategy, complement police reconstruction efforts by strengthening the capacity of specialised operational units to investigate serious organized crime and drug trafficking. This will include provision of specialist training, equipment and the appointment of international mentors.
2. Subject to the agreed organizational structure and policing strategy, support the development of a national system to gather, evaluate, disseminate and use intelligence in the promotion of an intelligence led approach to law enforcement.
3. Provide advice and input to complete a national assessment of organized crime and related drug trafficking, by collecting information at local, regional and national level on criminal groups. Such information will constitute the foundation for the establishment of a database on criminal groups and their activities in order to identify new crime trends and threats as well as to develop effective and proactive counter measures.
4. Support the establishment of an effective forensic scientific capacity. This should include drug testing and analysis and the provision of drug testing kits to operational law enforcement units.
5. Subject to the final structure of the criminal justice system, particularly as it relates to the functions of the prosecution, ensure the independence and accountability of prosecutors and provide training, guidance and support, including through the use of international mentors, for the prosecution of complex cases of organized crime.

### Effective systems of oversight for the police:

6. In order to ensure integrity and high professional standards within the Iraqi police, particularly those involved in tackling organized crime, support the strengthening of internal affairs units through training, the provision of equipment and the appointment of international mentors.
7. To ensure oversight of the police reform process and to achieve effective policing and the implementation of best practices, assist the Ministry of Interior to establish an efficient police inspectorate function.

### Customs and border control:

8. Subject to the agreed organizational structure and strategy for customs and border control, support ongoing efforts to train and equip customs and border control officers at identified vulnerable land, sea and air entry points.

### Judicial integrity:

9. Assist the judiciary in the development and implementation of judicial reform initiatives aimed at the strengthening of the integrity and capacity of the courts, enhancing access to justice, establishing accountability and oversight mechanisms in order to improve quality and timeliness of justice delivery, with particular focus on organized crime and drug trafficking. Such assistance could also include the reviewing and updating of rules regulating disciplinary mechanisms, as well as policies regarding the hiring, promotion, rotation and transfer of judges.

### **C. Drug control and abuse**

1. Following the establishment of the various Ministries involved, assist in the establishment of a national commission on drug control (mandate, terms of reference and functions) and assist in the formulation of a national drug control policy.
2. Assist in the establishment of regulations within the Ministry of Health to comply with the requirements of international obligations related to substances under international control.
3. Conduct an initial survey to determine the actual extent of drug abuse in Iraq.
4. Assist in strengthening the capacity of the Ibn-Rushd Hospital as an important specialist drug treatment centre in Baghdad.
5. Establish additional specialist drug treatment facilities in the northern and southern regions.
6. Provide training for staff working in the substance abuse field.
7. Assist in the development of a comprehensive national drug demand reduction awareness and educational programme.

### **D. International cooperation**

1. Facilitate the integration of Iraq into international fora concerned with drug control, crime prevention and criminal justice. For example, relevant UN bodies, ICPO-INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization.
2. Strengthen international judicial cooperation between Iraq and neighbouring countries with:
  - new or improved bilateral and multilateral legal cooperation agreements;
  - new or improved contact networks between justice, regulatory, enforcement or judicial officers;
  - building inter-legal system for mutual legal assistance and extradition capacity; and,
  - improved identification and resolution of legal and operational implementation problems.
3. Assist in developing information exchange and cooperation by organizing operational meetings between Iraqi law enforcement agencies and their counterparts in neighbouring countries. This would include the exchange of intelligence, the improvement of coordination, the facilitation of joint operational activities such as controlled deliveries, as well as the promotion of international cooperation in penal matters, particularly extradition and mutual legal assistance.

## **VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

135. Iraq has suffered from years of authoritarian rule, conflict and international isolation. It is a matter of serious concern that progress towards an open, free and democratic country could be radically undermined by the threat and actual reality posed by organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.

136. A key element along the road to security and stability and to prevent further growth in major crime and terrorism is the establishment of an effective criminal justice system with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This will require long term vision, considerable commitment and investment specifically in rebuilding the criminal justice system with particular emphasis on reforming the Iraqi police service and supporting the integrity, independence and

accountability of prosecutors and the judiciary in order to combat organized crime and drug trafficking.

137. The mission team are under no illusions about the magnitude of the reforms and work required. However, the window of opportunity will be brief. Failure to pursue the necessary reforms with speed and resources could result in serious consequences for the development of democracy and economic prosperity in Iraq.

## **ANNEX A:**

### **Terms of Reference for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Fact Finding Mission to Iraq, August 2003**

The mission will adopt a crime prevention and criminal justice approach, complementing other efforts being undertaken in the area of the rule of law. The assessment mission will mainly focus on the following areas:

1. An assessment of the nature and extent of drug trafficking and organized crime in Iraq, including such aspects as the trafficking in firearms across borders and other types of smuggling activities.
2. A review of existing legislative frameworks in place to counter drug trafficking and organized crime.
3. A determination of the capabilities of the competent crime prevention and criminal justice authorities to effectively counter organized crime and drug trafficking, including in the area of border control.
4. The making of specific recommendations in order to contribute to the upgrading of the legal framework, the strengthening of capacity and the improvement of the effectiveness of the competent crime prevention and criminal justice authorities to counter drug trafficking and organized crime.

## **ANNEX B:**

### **LIST OF OFFICIALS MET**

#### **IRAQI OFFICIALS**

##### **Governing Council:**

Sheikh Abdul Karim Al-Muhammadawi (Member)

Advisors to GC members:

Hader Shya

No Chirwan

Mr. Saad

Karim Sinjani

##### **Iraqi Police, Baghdad:**

General Hassan Ali Mali, Chief of Iraqi Police, Baghdad

Brigadier General Ahmad Kaeem Ibrahim, Chief of Operations (subsequently appointed Senior-Deputy Minister of Interior)

Captain Mustaq Fadher, Staff Officer to General Ahmad

Brigadier General Jafer Abid Alrasool

Captain Basim Mahmoud, Liaison Officer

##### **Hay-Al-Amil Police Station, Baghdad:**

Colonel Lutfi Ali

Lieutenant Colonel, Salam Zajey

Lieutenant Emad Hamza

Lieutenant Bazem Mohamad

Lieutenant Bazim Masud Hussein

Lieutenant Khalid Mohammad

##### **Mosul:**

Major-General Mohamed Khayre Mahmood, Chief of Police, Ninewa Province

Colonel Jamal Mahmud Abdula, Mosul Police

Captain Thayer Abdul Hmead, Mosul Police

Shamsedeem Khidher Elias, Customs Directorate, Mosul

Judge Faisal Hadid, Head of the Court of Appeal, Ninewa

Judge Hassan Mahmoud Ali, Head of Criminal Court, Ninewa

##### **Erbil – Kurdistan Regional Government representatives:**

Karim Sinjani, Minister of Interior

Tareq Rasheed Gardi, Director of the Cabinet of Ministry of the Interior

General Ahmad Fadhleddine, Director of Customs and Border Control Police

Brigadier Diler Ahmad Ako, Director of Police

##### **Iraq Port Authority:**

Abdul Rizzak Hassan, Director-General of Iraqi Ports

Abdul Hussain Mohammed, Deputy Director-General of Iraqi Ports

## **COALITION OFFICIALS**

### **Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA):**

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator

Ambassador David Richmond, Special Envoy for Iraq of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Ambassador Patrick F. Kennedy, Chief of Staff to Ambassador Bremer

### **Ministry of Interior, Baghdad:**

Bernard Kerik, Senior Policy Advisor

Mike Braun, Chief of Staff

Douglas Brand, Senior UK Police Mentor

Carr Trevolian, International Policing Advisor

Clifford Ames, International Policing Advisor

Larry Hines, Border Control Advisor

Alex van Kock, Border Control Advisor

### **Ministry of Justice, Baghdad:**

Judge Donald Campbell, Senior Policy Advisor

### **Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Baghdad:**

Ambassador Piero Cordone, Senior Policy Advisor

### **Ministry of Health, Baghdad:**

Chuck Fisher

Scott Svabek

### **Ministry of Transport and Communication, Baghdad:**

John Gaughan, Principal Maritime Advisor

### **United States Coalition Military, Baghdad:**

Brigadier General Hahn, Chief of Staff, Coalition Joint Task Force

Colonel Bob Hipwell, Provost Marshall

Colonel Brad Ward, Director of Ministry Teams

### **United Kingdom Coalition Military, Baghdad:**

Major General Freddie Viggers, Deputy Commander, Post-Conflict Operations

### **United States Coalition Military, 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Division, Baghdad International Airport:**

Lieutenant Colonel Rocco Stowers, Provost Marshall

Lieutenant Colonel Bert Robbins, Civil Military Relations

Captain Bob Cosgrove

Captain Mike Philipak, Military Intelligence

Major Mike Panko

Lieutenant Janie Ball, Operations Officer

Lieutenant Christine Chandler

Captain John Clifton, Military Police, US Army, Hay-Al-Amil Police Station, Baghdad

**Multi-National Division (MND) South-East, Basrah:**

Major Jerry Hartley, Staff Officer, Intelligence, UK

Lieutenant Colonel Chiari, Italy

Captain Luigi Bramati, Carrabinieri, Italy

Major Stad, Legal Team (Netherlands)

Captain Andrew Gifford, Royal Military Police, UK

**International Policing Team, Basrah:**

Joe Elder, UK Ministry of Defence Police

Mark Miller, UK Ministry of Defence Police

Kai Vittrup, Danish National Police

Erling Sorensen, Danish National Police

Morgins Bjerregaard, Danish National Police

**Umm Quasr Port:**

Major Robin Mudford, Royal Military Police, UK

Captain Steve Shea, 165 Port Regiment, Royal Logistics Core, UK

Warrant Officer Peter Greatorex, 165 Port Regiment, Royal Logistics Core, UK

**OTHER REPRESENTATIVES**

Antoine Sivan, Charge d’Affaire, Section des Interets Francais en Iraq, Baghdad

Cem Ulusay, Third Secretary, Embassy of Turkey, Baghdad

**UNITED NATIONS**

**United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI):**

Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq

Ramiro Lopes da Silva, Resident Coordinator of the United Nations

Nadia Younes, Chief of Staff to the SRSG

Jonathon Prentice, Special Assistance to the SRSG

Colonel Jeff Davie, Military Advisor to the SRSG

Jason Pronyk, Advisor, United Nations Development Group

Peter Brosen, Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, Mosul

**Other UN Agencies:**

Roger Guarda, UNDP, Team Leader: Institutional Strengthening and the Rule of Law

David Marshall, OHCHR, Leader: Rule of Law Sector

Dr. Nada Al Ward, WHO Consultant

Dr. Mufeed Ms Raooof, WHO Neuro-Psychiatrist Consultant

## ANNEX C:

### PROGRAMME

Time	Name/Location	Notes
<b>Tuesday 05 August 2003</b>		
1400	Arrive at Canal Hotel	On UNHAS flight from Amman
1430	Arrival administration	Arrival administration – Ms Wan Kitani. Connection of IT equipment, radio issue and radio check - Mr Alexis Del Rois.
1700	Security briefing at Canal Hotel	UNSECCORD standard new arrival brief.
1800	Depart for accommodation	Al-Rimal Hotel
<b>Wednesday 06 August 2003</b>		
0900	Meet Mr Bernie Kerick, Mr Mike Braun and Commissioner Doug Brand (Ministry of Interior)	Colonel Hipwell CJTF Provost Marshall also attended.
1100	Meet SRSG, Mr Vieira De Mello	Ms Nadia Younes (SRSG Chief of Staff) and Mr Jonathon Prentice (SRSG Special Assistant) also attended.
1500	Meet Ambassador Kennedy (CPA Chief of Staff)	
<b>Thursday 7 August 2003</b>		
0930	Meet with Major-General Freddie Viggers (UK) (Deputy Commanding General Post Conflict Operations)	
1300	Meet Mr David Richmond (UK Special Representative)	
1400	Meet with Commissioner Doug Brand	Follow-up visit
1500	Meet with Mr Carr Trevolian and Mr Clifford Ames (Ministry of Interior)	
TBC	Meet with Judge Campbell	
<b>Friday 8 August 2003</b>		
	Events rescheduled to Tuesday 12 Aug 03	UN Staff Movement suspended in Baghdad following security incidents on 7 August 2003, including bombing outside Jordanian Embassy. Work conducted at the hotel.
<b>Saturday 9 August 2003</b>		
0900	Travel Baghdad to Basra	By road

1700	Events re-scheduled due to security concerns in Basra	Coalition force stopped movement on selected routes and UN stopped all staff movement due to fuel related demonstrations and riots in Basra
	Overnight An-Nassiriyah	
<b>Sunday 10 August 2003</b>		
0900	Meet with Multi-National Division South-East	Basra Airport. Coordinated by Provost Marshall MND(SE) Lieutenant Colonel Bill Warren
1300	Meet with team of police advisors from the UK and Denmark	
1500	Visit Port Um-Qasar (UK National Support Element) and Umm Qasar road border crossing point	
2000	Meet with UK customs staff at Umm Qasar	
	Overnight Um Qasar	
<b>Monday 11 August 2003</b>		
<b>0900</b>	Visit Safwan road border crossing point	
0930	Travel Basra to Baghdad	By road
1900	Arrive Baghdad	Overnight Baghdad
<b>Tuesday 12 August 2003</b>		
1000	Meet with Mr Ramiro Da Silva (Coordinator UNOHCI)	
	Meet Embassy staff and staff from CPA Ministry of Health	
1300	Meet staff from 1st Armored Division (Baghdad)	Baghdad Airport. Coordinated by Provost Marshall Lieutenant Colonel Rocco Stowers.
1700	Visit Hy-Al-Amil Police Station	Met with Iraqi Police station chief and 18th MP Brigade station chief.
<b>Wednesday 13 August 2003</b>		
0900	Meet Brigadier General Ahmed Ibrahim, (Chief of Police Operations and Major Crimes Unit Baghdad)	Attended graduation ceremony at the Baghdad Police Academy.
1100	Meet Major General Hassan (Chief of Police Baghdad)	
1200	Meet with Justice Campbell (Ministry of Justice)	
1400	Meet with Representatives of the Governing Council	
1700	Discussion with Mr Kerick and Mr Braun	Follow-up visit
<b>Thursday 14 August 2003</b>		
0730	Travel Baghdad to Mosul	By road

1200	Meet with UN Office Coordinator Mosul, Mr. Peter Brorsen	
1400	Meet with Mosul Chief of Police	Colonel Davie met concurrently with staff from 101 <sup>st</sup> Airborne Division and brief the team.
1530	Meet with Mosul Chief of Customs	
1700	Meet with members of the provincial judiciary	
2000	Meet with the Special Advisor to the Director General of Health in Mosul	
	Overnight Mosul	
<b>Friday 15 August 2003</b>		
0730	Travel Mosul to Erbil	By road
0930	Follow-up meeting with Mr Karim Sinjari (Minster of Interior for Erbil and Dahuk Governorates)	Chief of Police and Chief of Customs for Erbil and Dahuk Governorates attended.
1330	Travel Erbil to Baghdad	By road
	Overnight Baghdad	
<b>Saturday 16 August 2003</b>		
1000	Exit meeting with Ambassador Bremer	Mr Braun attended
1130	Exit meeting with Brigadier General Hahn	Colonel Hipwell attended
1230	Exit meeting with Ambassador Richmond	
1700	Meet with Carr Foundation at their request	
1800	Exit meeting with SRSG	
<b>Sunday 17 August 2003</b>		
0900	Exit meeting with Major General Viggers and Commissioner Brand.	
1400	Team Depart	On UNHAS flight Baghdad to Amman

## **ANNEX D:**

### **LIST OF DOCUMENTATION CONSULTED**

*Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 1463 (2003) (S/2003/715)* 17 July 2003

Coalition Provisional Authority, Interior Ministry, *Iraq Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future*, 30 May 2003.

United States Department of Justice, *Report of the Iraq Judicial Assessment Team*, July 2003.

United Kingdom HM Customs and Excise, *The Iraqi Customs Service: A Scoping Study for Organizational Development and Capacity Building*, July 2003.

Human Rights Watch, *Climate of Fear: Sexual Violence and Abduction of Women and Girls in Baghdad*, July 2003.

United Nations Foundation, *Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations*, July 2003.

United States Institute of Peace, *Establishing the Rule of Law in Raw, Special Report*, April 2003